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Abstract 
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is 
insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequen-
ces of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in 
most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the 
insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain 
goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair 
markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the 
structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting 
backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of 
ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase 
in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair 
service suppliers, if repair markets are imperfect. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is 
insured. In these markets, which will be referred to as repair markets, a consumer purchases a 
good or repair service to compensate consequences of certain unfavorable events, such as an 
accident or an illness. Examples are segments of the markets for car repair services and rental 
cars as well as the markets for medical services and pharmaceutical products. 
The fact that consumers are insured, would by itself not cause economic problems so 
long as insurance companies are able to write complete contingent contracts assigning 
indemnity payments directly to any possible “state of the world”. Typically, though, the set of 
potential states of the world is rather complex implying that writing complete contracts would 
either be impossible or cause disproportionate transaction costs.1 For example, a complete 
contract in auto insurance would have to precisely define the indemnity payable in case of any 
possible damage to the involved autos. As the latter is usually not a realistic option, insurance 
policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the 
insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. 
In perfect repair markets the fact that consumers are insured would have no impact on 
the actual prices, since prices correspond to marginal cost. However, as empirical work, e.g. 
by Feldstein (1970), Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) and Pavcnik (2002) suggests, insurance 
design has a major impact upon repair markets. Therefore, it is intuitive to suppose that repair 
markets are imperfect since prices usually exceed marginal costs. A straightforward rationale 
for the latter is market power which can result from heterogeneous preferences or tastes. For 
the single consumer, transaction costs incurred in the process of consuming repair goods often 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Anderlini and Felli (1994), Segal (1999), Maskin (2002). 
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differ across suppliers, for instance depending on the location of suppliers relative to the 
consumer. In the context of car repair shops or rental cars, an illustration of this can be seen in 
spatial preferences. Another example can be observed in markets for pharmaceutical products 
and health services, where market power results from consumers’ designated preferences for 
certain suppliers. Given such preferences, it is an important task to analyze the implications of 
insurance for consumers’ demand decisions in imperfect repair markets. 
If repair markets are imperfect and consumers are insured, prices of repair goods are 
directly affected by insurance arrangements. Consequently, an extension of coverage will lead 
to increasing prices for repair goods. Note that this line of argument is valid even in the 
absence of any ex post moral hazard problems: Consider a situation where coverage is based 
upon consumers’ expenses and insurance companies are able to effectively control quality of 
repair goods purchased. In such a situation consumers’ product choice will also be less price 
sensitive and will therefore lead to a price increase, if they have certain preferences among 
suppliers. 
An illustrative example – The German car rental market 
In repair markets price discrimination between insured and uninsured consumers is 
quite common and prices are significantly higher for insured consumers. As an example for 
this, consider the German car rental market. 
In this market a major segment of insured consumers can easily be identified by rental 
car suppliers: The business in accident substitute rental cars accounts for roughly 30 % of the 
entire market.2 Consumers in this segment temporarily substitute a vehicle that was damaged 
in an accident. They are either compensated by their collision loss insurer or they have a valid 
                                                 
2  See Bundesverband der Autovermieter e.V. [Association of Car Rental Companies], Autovermietung, 
Düsseldorf 1998. 
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claim for a substitute car against the other party or, effectively, the other party’s liability 
insurer.3 Therefore, this segment consists exclusively of consumers whose rental car expenses 
are covered by an insurance company, while consumers’ expenses in the remaining share of 
the market are uninsured. 
In the 1990s, differences in rates for substitute and non-substitute rental cars in the 
German market could be easily investigated, as pricing information for these segments were 
determined and published on a regular basis.4 The data were collected for different car classes 
and different zip code areas and consisted of information from the most popular tariffs. The 
following table lists average rates from the years 1997 through 1999 for the most frequently 
rented car class in 100 randomly chosen zip code areas. 
Table 1: Average rates in the German rental car market 1997-1999 
(car class „5“, 100 randomly chosen zip code areas) 
Daily Rate Weekly Rate Year 
Substitute 
Cars 
Non-Substitute 
Cars 
Difference Substitute Cars Non-Substitute 
Cars 
Difference
1997 346.15 DM 
(29.87)5
277.22 DM 
(45.56) 
24.9 % 2025.56 DM 
(260.68) 
1640.95 DM 
(301.28) 
23.4% 
1998 359.60 DM 
(33.54) 
312.02 DM 
(42.11) 
15.2 % 2144.28 DM 
(336.05) 
1812.27 DM 
(293.47) 
18.3% 
1999 374.59 DM 
(32.97) 
319.71 DM 
(44.16) 
17.2 % 2262.56 DM 
(312.61) 
1903.52 DM 
(321.4) 
18.9% 
Source: Schwacke-Bewertung GmbH & Co KG, SchwackeLISTE-Automietpreisspiegel, Osnabrück 1997, 1998, 
1999. 
                                                 
3  Please note that auto liability insurance (without any coinsurance) is mandatory in Germany. Therefore, in 
almost any case, this liability claim is covered through insurance. 
4  The EurotaxSchwacke GmbH company regularly published a survey concerning the prices for rental cars in 
Germany, which distinguished between the accident substitute business and the so called free business and 
reported them separately. 
5  The values given in brackets are the empirical standard deviations. 
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During the sample period, rates in the substitute car business exceeded the rates for non-
substitute cars by 15.2 – 24.9 %. More precisely, these numbers can be considered lower bounds 
for the actual price differences, as the non-substitute tariffs were adjusted by means of a general 
additional collision coverage component.6 The price differences displayed in Table 1 can not be 
explained by ex post moral hazard, since the quantity and the quality of substitute cars can easily 
be observed by insurance companies. 
Surprisingly, only few theoretical papers so far have dealt with the interdependencies 
between insurance and repair markets. Frech and Ginsburg (1975), for example, address the 
question of how, in a monopolistic health care market, different types of insurance benefits 
affect price and quantity. They find, among other results, that in any case both parameters will 
increase, with prices tending to infinity for the case of complete insurance. However, since, 
e.g., the markets for medical or car repair services typically have an oligopolistic or atomistic 
structure, the results of Frech and Ginsburg (1975) do not capture the situation in most of the 
repair markets and particularily the externality problem we are interested in. Gaynor et al. 
(2000) analyze the interdependence between the degree of competition in health care markets 
and the extent of excess consumption due to insurance. Their results indicate that even in the 
presence of insurance-induced changes in price elasticity, consumers benefit from increased 
competition in health care markets. 
The existing related empirical literature, which also for the most part addresses the 
demand for health care and pharmaceutical products, is extensive. Most of the findings are 
straightforward and correspond to the theoretical results mentioned above. For instance, 
Newhouse et al. (1993) found that patients with full insurance coverage used significantly 
                                                 
6  This extra price component was added, since rates in the German substitute car market generally include 
liability as well as collision and comprehensive coverage, while rates for non-substitute cars often only 
include liability insurance and certain additional partial coverage, but the available data did not include the 
actual precise range of insurance coverage. Therefore, for the non-substitute car rates as given in the table, 
there is a tendency of overstating the correct values. 
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more health care than those who had to co-pay directly. (The study also showed that the 
different insurance plans the participating households had been assigned did not significantly 
affect their health situation). In a recent paper, Pavcnik (2002) analyzes how a reduction of 
insurance coverage influences pharmaceutical product prices. Her results show that these 
prices decrease considerably as patients’ out-of-pocket expenses increase. 
Several studies by Feldstein show that physicians in medical markets raise their fees 
and improve their products when insurance coverage becomes broader, and even non-profit 
hospitals respond to an increase in insurance by increasing the sophistication and the price of 
their service (Feldstein 1970, 1971). More importantly and probably somewhat puzzlingly at 
first glance, empirical analysis indicates that a reduction of the actual demand of insurance 
coverage would induce a welfare gain, i.e. individuals purchase too much insurance (Feldstein 
1973, the issue was revisited by Feldman and Dowd 1991). This is surprising, as one would 
expect that working insurance markets provide the optimal amount of coverage even in the 
presence of moral hazard. In particular, the existence of ex post moral hazard can not explain 
why insurance companies offer insurance contracts with more coverage than the socially 
desirable amount. Given the above mentioned empirical findings Feldstein emphasizes: “(…) 
even the uninsured individual will find that his expenditure on health services is affected by 
the insurance of others” and furthermore suggests that the over-insurance result is due to a 
prisoner’s dilemma, as “People spend more on health because they are insured and buy more 
insurance because of the high cost of health care”.7 One of the goals of this paper is to 
provide a theoretical explanation for this finding by showing that companies in competitive 
insurance markets will face an externality problem, if repair markets are imperfect and 
insurance contracts are incomplete. Therefore, the risk allocation and the price increasing 
                                                 
7  Feldstein (1973), p. 252. 
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effects of insurance coverage are suboptimally balanced, and subsequently, insurance 
contracts entail too much coverage. 
The reason why the interaction between insurance and repair markets has not yet been 
studied more extensively from a theoretical point of view presumably can be seen in the 
typical perception of insurance in the economics literature: Insurance contracts are usually 
interpreted as a specific kind of financial contract, in which the insured – in return for the 
premium – acquires a claim upon future state-contingent payments. Most precisely, this has 
been stated by Arrow: “insurance is the exchange of money now for money payable 
contingent on the occurrence of certain events”8. According to this view, insurance contracts 
are considered complete in the sense that the amount of indemnity can be directly tied to the 
occurrence of states of the world. However, as has been stated above, this is not what we 
observe in important lines of insurance, where the insured, in case of a loss, receives coverage 
based upon his or her actual repair expenses. Therefore, these insurance contracts are 
incomplete, as the insurer’s payments are not unambiguously given and, in particular, depend 
on the prices for repair services. 
In this paper, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by 
focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the number of suppliers in 
markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal 
insurance contracting. To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that no information 
asymmetries exist and that insurance is available at actuarially fair premiums. Frictions, 
however, exist in the repair market. We consider a repair market with product differentiation 
which provides the single supplier with a certain spatial market power. The model framework 
employed here is based upon an approach introduced by Salop (1979). Basically, the focus is 
                                                 
8 Arrow (1965), p. 45. 
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on indescribable contingencies in insurance arrangements. We are interested in the impact of 
incomplete insurance contracts on imperfect repair markets. As the introduction of incomplete 
contracts means a substantial imperfectness and because our analysis is supposed to 
concentrate on this problem, we will abstain from other imperfections, especially any ex post 
moral hazard problems in insurance markets. 
In contrast to the existing literature, we also study a new aspect of the problem concer-
ning the optimal structure of insurance markets: A pareto-efficient insurance contract maxi-
mizes the expected utility of consumers under certain constraints. The main task for the 
insurer in the considered context is to balance the trade off between risk allocation and the 
insurance-induced price effect in the repair market. But the limiting effect of a coinsurance 
rate on the repair market price level depends on the market share of the offering insurance 
company. In an atomistic market a single insurer’s contract design only has a negligible 
impact on the repair market and its price level. Consequently, the equilibrium coinsurance rate 
will increase in the market share of a particular insurer or decrease in the number of insurance 
companies respectively. Thus, insurance companies are indeed facing a prisoner’s dilemma 
problem as suggested by Feldstein. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In 
Section 3 we present benchmarks for the following analysis. Section 4 discusses the impact of 
incomplete insurance contracts on the structure of the repair market, while section 5 addresses 
effects in the insurance market. Section 6 deals with the externality problem in competitive 
insurance markets and Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model framework 
Our analysis focuses on the optimal insurance design and the number of firms in repair 
markets with insured consumers. We assume that consumers have heterogeneous preferences. 
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These preferences are interpreted as being caused by consumers’ spatial distribution. We 
consider n suppliers, denoted nj ,...,1=  that offer a good respectively a repair service. Each 
company offers a repair service at the price  and the suppliers compete in prices a la 
Bertrand.
jp
9 Consumers with an initial wealth of  face the risk of a loss with probability 0w π . 
In case of a loss suppliers offer one repair unit, which fully restores the loss, but consumers 
face transportation cost t that increases in the distance x to the supplier. The model framework 
is based upon the circular city model by Salop (1979), where consumers are uniformly and 
continuously distributed along a circle with a perimeter equal to π/1 .10 Consumers have a 
twice-differentiable utility function ( )wu  with 0)(,0)( <⋅′′>⋅′ uu , where w represents the final 
wealth of consumers. Thus, consumers’ preferences are only heterogeneous with respect to 
the repair good. In the insurance market m risk-neutral insurers, denoted , 
simultaneously offer contracts 
mi ,...,1=
( )iii IC ,α=  which consist of an indemnity jii pI )1( δ−= , 
where [ 1,0∈i ]δ  denotes the individual contract’s coinsurance rate, and an actuarially fair 
break-even premium ii Iπα = .  
We further assume that consumers suffering from a loss always derive a surplus from 
consuming a unit of the repair good. Exactly one unit is purchased. Through these 
assumptions we abstain from the problem of ex post moral hazard (Pauly 1968), as the extent 
of purchased repair services is independent of the amount of coverage. This is plausible in 
situations where only one repair unit is necessary and over-consumption has no value for 
consumers. Assuming that uninsured consumers derive a surplus from purchasing the repair 
                                                 
9  To make things as simple as possible, we rather model the price competition between insurance companies 
explicitly and only consider that every single insurance contracts leads to zero expected profits. 
10  This assumption implies that the ex post size of the repair market, after the realization of losses, is one. 
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service implies that insured consumers with an insurance contract  strictly prefer to 
demand the service in case of an accident. 
iC
The sequence of the considered game between insurers, consumers and suppliers is as 
follows: At stage 1, each of the m insurance companies simultaneously offers a break-even 
insurance contract . Then at stage 2, the potential entrants in the repair market 
simultaneously choose whether or not to enter the market. Suppliers that entered are 
equidistantly distributed on the circle. As we analyze the problem of the number of suppliers 
entering the market, we assume that the potential entrants face fixed entry costs of . 
Because of the free entry assumption the equilibrium profit of entering firms is zero. Finally, 
at stage 3 the suppliers that have entered set their prices , given their locations. 
iC
0>f
jp
3. Social optima 
As a reference point for the following analysis, we take a look at different benchmark 
situations. Let us first start with situations where complete insurance contracts are feasible. 
These contracts and the associated indemnity can be conditioned upon any possible state of 
nature. Under such ideal circumstances the optimal insurance arrangement is straightforward: 
since insurance companies can anticipate the (equilibrium market) price for a repair unit, the 
indemnity corresponds to the equilibrium price and the resulting transportation cost of each 
consumer. 
First Best 
The first best insurance contract entails (a) an optimal risk allocation and (b) minimizes the 
sum of standing expenses, consumers’ transportation cost and repair expenses:11
                                                 
11  For further details concerning the determination of first and second-best prices as well as the associated 
numbers of suppliers see Salop (1979). 
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⎢
⎣
⎡
+ ∫nn dxxtnnf
2
1
0
2min . (1) 
The solution is characterized by the following conditions: 
(a)    with iFBi txpI += tfcpFB 21+=  and 
(b) 
f
tn FB
2
1= . 
One of the main results of the Salop model is that in equilibrium too many suppliers 
enter the repair market. Thus, condition (b) is not met, if repair and insurance market are 
independent. However, when the structure of the repair market is endogenous, vertically 
integrating the repair market can potentially lead to a first best situation. By overriding the 
Salop competition in the repair market insurance companies can reduce the number of 
operating repair service suppliers. A monopoly insurer or a coalition of all insurance 
companies can establish a repair service network with a first best number of repair shops and 
consumers are fully compensated for any losses. 
Second Best 
In a second best situation, complete insurance contracts are still feasible, but due to legal or 
other restrictions, insurance companies are not able to enforce structural actions which 
influence or offset the competition in the repair market. Thus, the second best is characterized 
by the following condition: 
(a)    with iSBi txpI += tfcpSB +=  and 
(b) 
f
tn SB = . 
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As in the first best situation, the risk allocation is still first best. However, as has been shown 
by Salop, in equilibrium too many suppliers enter the market. This leads to a welfare loss 
compared to the first best situation. 
Third Best 
A further welfare loss is incurred when insurance contracts are incomplete. The optimal 
incomplete insurance contract trades off the insurance-induced price effect on the repair 
market and risk allocation. We will derive the third best insurance contract in the following 
two sections.  
4. Effects in the repair market 
Starting with the price competition at stage 3, we assume that n  suppliers have entered the 
market. In this situation, consumers decide upon deterministic outcomes and only those who 
suffered a loss purchase the repair unit. We assume in the first instance that all consumers 
accepted the same incomplete insurance contract with a strictly positive coinsurance rate 
( 0> )δ .12 Subsequently, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria, where all suppliers charge 
the same price . Each firm has only two surrounding competitors. In order to derive a single 
supplier’s demand function, let us consider supplier j. A consumer located between supplier j 
and one of its neighbors (offering a repair unit at the price p) at the distance  from 
supplier j is indifferent between the two competitors, if 
p
[ 1,0∈x ]
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=+ x
n
tptxp j
1δδ  (2) 
holds. 
                                                 
12  In section 5 it will be shown that 0=δ  can never be a part of an equilibrium. 
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To highlight the effects of insured consumers on the structure of repair markets, we 
rewrite (2) as 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=+ x
n
tpxtp j
1
δδ . (3) 
The transportation cost rate t indicates the suppliers’ market power, as it determines to 
what extent prices of repair services can exceed marginal cost. If a consumer is insured and, 
thus, δ  is below one, the market power of repair firms is increased. 
The resulting demand function of supplier j  is given by 
t
pp
n
t
xppD
j
jj
)(
2),(
−+
==
δ
. (4) 
Each firm j  maximizes its profit function 
f
t
pp
n
t
cppp
j
jjjp j
−
−+
−=Π
)(
)(),(max
δ
, (5) 
where c denotes the per-unit cost of providing the repair good. The first order condition 
for a profit maximum in a symmetric equilibrium with pp j =  is 
n
tcp δ+= . (6) 
The price level in the repair market decreases in the number of entering firms and in the 
coinsurance rate. The number of entering firms is therefore endogenously determined by the 
following zero profit constraint 
0)( 2 =−=Π fn
tpj δ . (7) 
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In the context of free market entry the number of firms in equilibrium is given by 
f
tn δ=
* . (8) 
Even without insurance, the number of suppliers in market equilibrium  is too high 
compared to the first best situation. Given a strictly positive coinsurance 
*n
0>δ , the number of 
operating service suppliers is higher than the first and the second best optimum (Salop 1979), 
. The equilibrium price level in the repair market is FBSB nnn >>*
δ
tfcp +=* . (9) 
In equations (8) and (9) the case of uninsured consumers refers to 1=δ . Thus, 
insurance leads to an increase in the number of suppliers as well as in the market price. The 
intuition behind these results is straightforward: Insurance increases the marginal profit with 
respect to the price, as δ  declines. The increased marginal profit of firms attracts additional 
entrants and reduces, therefore, the segment size n
1  covered by an individual supplier. The 
increase in the number of operating firms in the repair market offsets the market entry 
incentives which are due to the increase in marginal profits. In other words, insurance 
arrangements make related repair markets more attractive for entrants and further increase the 
socially undesirable level of fixed cost in the repair market even though the expected 
transportation costs decline. 
5. Effects in the insurance market 
Now we are able to determine the third best insurance contract. Due to the complexity of the 
states of nature, insurers are assumed to be unable to fully specify the behavior of consumers 
and suppliers in the case of a loss. Consequently, insurance contracts can only be conditioned 
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upon the consumer’s expenses for the repair good. For simplicity reasons we further assume 
transportation costs to be uninsurable. 
The third best insurance contract maximizes the expected utility of an average consumer 
under the constraint that insurance contracts break even. The optimal insurance contract and 
in particular the coinsurance rate  trades off the insurance-induced price effect and risk 
allocation. Therefore,  is specified by the following expected utility maximization 
problem: 
TBδ
TBδ
( ) ( ) ( )
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The first order condition for an interior solution is given by 
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The following two propositions characterize the third best insurance contract. 
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Proposition 1 
A third best optimal insurance contract can not entail full coverage ( )0>TBδ . 
Proof: 
As  is obviously strictly increasing in nw δ , the third-best solution is characterized by 
( ) .0
8
1
2
11
2
1
33 <−+−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=∂
∂
δδδδδπδδπδ
tftftftfctfcwl    (12) 
Rearranging yields the condition 
( )( ) 312
1
8
1)1( δδπδδδπ
tftftfc −+>+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−  (13) 
Multiplying (13) by δ  leads to 
( ) ( )( ) δδπδδδδπ tftftfc −+>++− 12181)1(  (14) 
The LHS of (14) tends to zero and the RHS of (14) tends to infinity for δ  converging to 
zero. Thus, for a given loss probability π , production costs  and transportations costs , 
there will always be a critical coinsurance rate  such that the impact of a marginal 
increase in coverage in the state of loss is zero. Since consumers’ wealth in the no loss state is 
strictly increasing in 
c t
0>cδ
δ , the third best coinsurance rate  has to be greater than . TBδ cδ
q.e.d. 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward: The optimal insurance contract trades 
off the benefit of an improved risk allocation and the costs of the insurance-induced price 
effect. On the one hand, the marginal benefit from an improved risk allocation due to an 
additional increase in insurance coverage is decreasing in coverage and diminishes if 
consumers are fully insured. On the other hand, the marginal price effect is strictly increasing 
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in coverage and tends to infinity as the coinsurance rate tends to zero. Consequently, the third 
best contract cannot provide full insurance. 
Now we turn to the question of whether the optimal insurance contract entails any 
coverage at all ( ). 1<TBδ
Proposition 2 
If consumers are sufficiently risk-averse, the third best contract entails partial 
insurance ( )10 << TBδ . Otherwise the third best contract does not provide any coverage 
( )1=TBδ . 
Proof: 
A necessary condition for  is that the marginal expected utility at 1<TBδ 1=δ  is 
negative. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
8
1
2
1)()()1(
11
1
<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−+′++′−=∂
∂
==
=
tftftfctfcwutfcwuEU nn ππππδ δδδ
 (15) 
Rearranging terms yields the condition 
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 (16) 
The RHS of (16) is strictly smaller than one. The LHS is strictly between zero and one 
and decreases in the consumer’s absolute risk aversion. Therefore, (16) can only be met if 
consumers are sufficiently risk-averse. 
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If consumers are sufficiently risk-averse, is implicitly defined by TBδ
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Consumers prefer to stay uninsured with  if 1=TBδ
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The LHS of (18) increases as the consumer’s risk aversion decreases. For a virtually 
risk-neutral consumer, the LHS converges to one. Therefore, the third best contract for a 
weakly risk-averse consumer does not provide any coverage. 
q.e.d 
Starting from the point where consumers are initially uninsured, a marginal increase in 
coverage increases the price for a repair unit and decreases transportation costs due to 
additional entries in the repair market. However, the overall costs for consumers are 
increasing, since the price effect outweighs the transportation costs effect. Thus, consumers 
are only better off with insurance coverage, if the benefit from improved risk allocation 
exceeds the increase in total costs. The benefit of risk allocation depends on the degree of 
consumers’ risk aversion and therefore weakly risk-averse consumers prefer to stay 
uninsured. 
Our results are mainly in line with standard moral hazard models like Shavell (1979). 
Optimal contracts derived from the latter model framework generally entail only partial 
coverage, due to a trade-off between risk allocation and appropriate loss prevention 
incentives. However, three important features distinguish our results from those of standard 
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moral hazard models: First of all, in a moral hazard context the limitation of insurance 
coverage is a result of asymmetric information and reduced carefulness of policyholders. In 
our model it is only due to incomplete insurance contracts and the associated coverage-
induced increase in prices. Secondly, the fact that weakly risk-averse consumers in our model 
may prefer to stay uninsured is in contrast to results from standard moral hazard models 
where risk-averse consumers always prefer to purchase some insurance coverage. Starting 
from a position of no coverage, in standard moral hazard models insurance does not affect 
policyholders’ incentives at the margin. In contrast, in our model a marginal increase of 
coverage has a first order effect which is due to a coverage-induced price increase. Finally, 
and probably most importantly: At first glance, one would expect the contracting parties (in a 
moral hazard setting) to agree at least upon a second-best optimal insurance contract. In our 
model this is generally not the case, as the offered coinsurance rate considerably affects the 
market price for the repair service and therefore has an impact on other insurance 
arrangements. Hence, each individual insurer faces an externality problem, which we will 
tackle in the next section. 
6. Market structure and externalities in the insurance market 
In what follows we assume that an interior solution with  exists. Optimal 
insurance contracts in standard moral hazard models efficiently solve the incentive problem 
between the two contracting parties and do not have any impact on other insurance 
arrangements. However, in the problem studied here each individual incomplete insurance 
contract affects the market price for the repair service and therefore the optimal contracting in 
other insurance relationships, as the following proposition illustrates. 
10 << TBδ
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Proposition 3 
The equilibrium coinsurance rate  increases strictly in the market share of insurance 
companies. 
*δ
Proof: See the Appendix 
The capability to reduce the price effect in repair markets induced by insured consumers 
declines in the number of insurers, as the fraction of the market affected by a single insurer’s 
coinsurance rate variation decreases. Consider an atomistic market structure. In this situation, 
insurance contracts offered by a single insurer have a negligible impact on the price level on 
the repair market. Therefore, in a competitive insurance market with  a problem of 
externalities arises and the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all insurance companies 
split the market equally is neither pareto-optimal nor second-best. The difference between the 
equilibrium coinsurance rate and  is the greater the higher the number of insurers. In 
this sense, a reduction of coverage in a competitive insurance market improves welfare. Thus, 
by explicitly considering externality problems in competitive insurance markets our model 
provides a theoretical explanation for Feldstein’s empirical results. 
2≥m
*δ TBδ
Given the externality problems associated with incomplete insurance contracts, the 
question arises how this externality should be addressed. Considering our results, one obvious 
solution might be an insurance monopoly.13 A monopoly insurer completely takes the impact 
of the level of coverage on the repair market price level into account and, thus, offers 
contracts that entail a coinsurance rate . Obviously, however, a monopoly is a strong SBδ
                                                 
13  In other contexts authors also have recently argued that insurance monopolies for certain areas achieve better 
results than competitive markets. See, for instance, the empirical findings by Ungern-Sternberg (1996) for 
the case of homeowner’s insurance and the discussion of interdependent security problems by Kunreuther 
and Heal (2003). However, as noted by Bonato and Zweifel (2002), monopoly insurers in a moral hazard 
context may mandate an excessive level of loss prevention. Therefore, other effects limit the superiority of 
such an insurance market structure. 
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market intervention that would be associated with major additional issues that may negatively 
affect welfare. Particularly, the socially desirable rent distribution would have to be 
implemented. For instance, authorities could regulate prices implying the insurer charges only 
actuarially fair premiums. Taking the problems associated with an insurance monopoly into 
account, a vertical integration of insurance and repair markets seems to be a much more 
appropriate approach. An insurer could itself offer certain repair goods or it could co-operate 
with a supplier of these goods. In this case the coverage induced increases in prices as well as 
in the number of suppliers in the repair market can be avoided.14 Vertical integration is, e.g., 
fairly well-developed in the American health insurance market (Managed Care), while in the 
European health sector as well as in auto insurance it can only be observed in its infancy.  
7. Conclusion 
In numerous lines of insurance, such as, for instance, health or auto insurance, indemnities are 
based on the actual extent of repair services the insured purchases. Insurance coverage of this 
kind, however, has a major impact upon associated repair markets, if the latter are not perfect: 
The price level for repair services as well as the number of suppliers increase. The rising price 
level again affects the optimal insurance contract design, since even in perfect insurance 
markets with complete information an optimal contract would assign a share of the loss to the 
insured. It cannot be expected, though, that insurers in a competitive market offer the optimal 
contract, as the price increase induced by insurance coverage would not occur only for the 
single insurer but affects all insurers in the market. This means that an externality exists. 
Therefore, insurers will offer contracts with less coinsurance and thus more coverage than 
socially desirable. 
                                                 
14  Vertical integration can also be a powerful tool against ex post moral hazard. 
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In the light of our incomplete contract argumentation, our model setup seems to 
oversimplify reality, as we only consider one type of loss. However, we have to keep in mind 
that real insurance contracts apprehend a great variety of losses. Therefore, contracts 
conditioned upon each state of the world or each possible loss can hardly be written. Even if 
any kind of lump-sum compensation for certain losses which would reduce price effects in the 
repair market is socially desirable, it will hardly be feasible in most lines of insurance. 
This paper is a first step toward analyzing the interdependencies between insurance and 
repair markets. Naturally, we had to leave important aspects for future research. From our 
point of view, the following problems could be rather interesting topics to be tackled: 
• We assume that the product space is completely homogeneous. This means that no 
product is a priori better than the other. This assumption seems adequate e.g. for auto 
insurance, since consumers’ preferences for repair services are mainly determined by 
availability and convenience. On the other hand, patients would often have prede-
termined preferences for certain pharmaceutical products, as in particular copyright-
protected products. It therefore seems fruitful to also look at repair markets with hetero-
geneous product spaces. 
• In this paper, the assumption has been used that the insured is also the consumer for the 
repair service. But this is not useful to characterize liability insurance where the victim, 
who has a claim against the insured, purchases repair services. The victim usually has a 
legal right to be fully compensated, such that in liability insurance the impact on repair 
markets should be even more significant. 
• When insurers cannot write complete contracts and, thus, the price level of repair 
services rises, a vertical integration of insurance and repair markets seems a straight-
forward approach. For this reason, the introduction of vertical integration seems to be an 
important extension of this analysis. 
 22
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3 
We consider an insurance market with  identical insurers that compete simultaneously 
in contracts. For convenience we further assume that insurers who offer the same utility 
maximizing contract split the market equally. First we look at the effects of a single insurer’s 
variation of the coinsurance rate 
1≥m
iδ  on the repair market.  
A consumer located between suppliers j and j+1 is indifferent between the two 
competitors, if 
)/1( xntptxp iji −+=+ δδ  if the consumer is insured by the insurer i and 
)/1( xntptxp iji −+=+ −− δδ otherwise. 
The fraction of consumers insured by i is 
m
1 , while the fraction of consumers not 
insured by i is 
m
m 1−
. 
The resulting demand function of firm j  is given by 
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For a symmetric equilibrium one obtains 
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The zero profit constraint implies 
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Now we are able to determine the optimal contract for insurer i. It is given by 
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The first order condition for an interior solution is given by  
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Subsequently, using the implicit functions theorem we show that the equilibrium 
coinsurance rate  decreases in the number of operating insurance companies, . We 
consider: 
*
iδ m
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Because of the second order condition for a maximum, the denominator in the 
expression on the RHS of (25) is negative. Thus, it is sufficient to show that the nominator is 
also negative:   
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We derive 
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At  these partial derivatives and, therefore, expressions (I) and (III) are zero. 
Additionally, since 
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(II) and (IV) are negative which proves the proposition.      
q.e.d. 
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